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ABSTRACT
Thepaper applies an aggregate supplyand demand framework for the study of
Israel's brand of stagflation. After a very rapid growthperiod between 1967—1973
Israel's subsequent share growth slowdown andaccelerated inflation seem particularly
marked by any international comparison. The unemploymentrate and the current
account deficit have on average risen less.
An attempt is made to disentangle the effectsof supply shifts (raw material
price and real wage changes) and therole of demand management and the main macro
policy trade—offs. Unlike othermiddle—income countries which continued to expand by
borrowing heavily, Israel could not substantiallyincrease an. already large foreign
debt and had to sacrifice growth and price stabilityto overcome the large post—1973
current account deficit. This trade—off wasconsiderably exacerbated on the domestic
front by the inability to reverse an earliertrend of rapidly rising public
expenditure and employment. While thisaccounts for a relatively low unemployment
rate it also hampered the growth potential, particularlyof exportables. After 1917
developments are dominated by very much higher,self_perpetuating, inflation which
was set in motion by an ill—fated foreignexchange liberalization plan and theloss
of monetary control. This has further worsenedthe current_account/inflation
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EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND DOMEST IC RESPONSE: ISRAEL' SMACROECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 1965— 1982k
I NTRODUCT ION
In retrospect, the period beginning in the mid—1950sand ending
in 1972—73 may be considered the 'golden age' ofIsrael's
economic development. With the exception of a brief slumpin
1966—67, the years until 1972 were characterized by veryrapid
growth: during 1960—72 real GDP grew at 10 percent perannum (13
percent during 1968—72), capital stock at 9 percent,labor input
at 4 percent (7 percent during 1968—72), and total factor
productivity at 4 percent (6 percent during1968—72).
This period was also marked by relatvely harmless changes
in the price level, with inflation running at anannual rate of
6—7 percent and with workable institutional solutionsto its
potential distortive effects (wage and savingsindexation). Even
the balance of payments did not seem to pose aninsurmountable
problem. By 1972 exports financed about twothirds of imports
(compared with one seventh in 1950, and half in 1960),with the
* Very able research assistance was provided by Carlos
Bachrach to whom I am very grateful. I would also like tothank
Haim Barkai, Voram Ben—Porath, Stanley Fischer, Mordecai
Fraenkel, Nadav Halevi, and Jeffrey Sachs for helpfulcomments on
an earlier draft.2
remaining third easily covered by abundant foreign capital in the
form of unilateral transfersand well phased long—term loans.
These were accompanied by a renewed surge of immigration during
the post—1967 euphoria, and combined with a very flexible labor
market (once the Israeli labor market was opened to Arab workers
from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1968) which enabled the
continued rapid expansion of industry, directed particularly
towards export markets.
The only signs of impending trouble appeared on the internal
social front. An Israeli version of a Black Panther movement
was formed towards the end of the war of attrition on the Suez
Canal, drawing growing attention to hitherto neglected domestic
problems. In the 3—4 years preceding the 1973 war Israel
allocated an ever—increasing share of its domestic resources to
the expansion of social services (education, health, and welfare)
and developed an income— maintenance scheme which is one of the
most advanced in the world——while defense expenditures were
rising. Little thought, if any, was given to the possibility
that a major crisis was lying ahead, one which would turn
internal political commitments into a heavy economic liability.
The 1973 war marked a watershed in almost any field
conceivable, and certainly in economics. The broad aggregates
for the period since 1973 seem to come from an entirely different
economy. Growth came to a virtual standstill; in almost no year
after 1973 did GDP grow by more than 4—5 percent, and usually by
much less; inflation soared by 30—40 percent annually during
1974—77 and reached triple digits by 1980. The current account3
deficit in current dollar prices quadrupled during 1972—75,and
though it fell sharply by 1977 it grew againin 1978—79, and once
again in 1981—83. The foreign debt continuedto grow——albeit at
a slower rate, commensurate with the muchreduced SDP growth.
While the system for a time adapted to the phenomenal ratesof
inflation with relative ease, the ensuing economic and social
frictions worsened considerably.
The object of the present discussion is to put some of these
developments in their proper perspective, especially in view of
the crisiS in the entire industrial world. Once a stylized
description is given of the typical response of countries to
supply shocks, one can examine the extent to which developments
in Israel fit in with a more—or—less explainable broader
worldwide pattern or differed from it. Such a perspective also
helps in avoiding two pitfalls: placing the entire blame on
external causes, or attributing all the developments to home—made
blunders.
SectiOn I gives an overview of the main developments ip
growth, balance of payments, and inflation against the background
of worldwide stagflation. Section II lays out a theoretical
•framework within which the roles of supply and demand shifts are
analyzed. This is followed by an empirical analysis of outüt,
employment, and relative price changes by sub—period (Section
III), and related developments in the current account (Section
IV) and in the inflationary process (Section V). A short summary
of Israel's macroeconomic performance is given in the concluding
section (VI).LI.
I S1—c:;EL. 'SE]Ft(NJL) c]F::csfl(3I: AllONANOVERvi EN
Thewor ciat:: onomy st_i-f f are:'cI sevare:sei-i. c:'t..ts sli tic: I-:5dL '---i. nq t:h a
par i ad i. nvast I pat ad hera..The + :i rst wasa coil apse of the
Br atton Woods system off i a ad ax c:: hanqa rates at: the en ci o-t the
i.960s -F o]. 1 owi.nq the massi vaout-fl ow do!]. arsfrom the Unitec:i
States 1. r the wa I.:: a of the wars :1 n 3c:)L.tt:lEast As:ia.. Fh :t s was
4-oIlowed by sub st anti a! monatar ax pan si on I n most IE:LJ.) c:ot_int. rias
at 1 ma of -4 u]. 1am:I. oymant wh :ichpanar at ac:I wor ]. ci -—w:i cia
I n-f 1ati onary pressures.. Both of these tr ends ha:tclwcaakenad by the
heci nni rip 0.4: 197:
The sar:oncl •heaviat-ioc: 1< Jsthec:ommod :i ty-——pr I c:e
axp1Os .1. onat: t: ha endof i. 9 71..Themost s i cm .ç:c: ant 4 at: or ..J;.icz
themall c:tIsi s •hithe c:oml:D:Lna(:i:increasari the pr :i. ces 0 mosi
ot her i n dustr- I a i raw materia 1 s al sohadpu I t a asub stant: i a!
t houcli I. ass per manen 1: •a-f-fr-ai-t., yp :i caL].yI he in-f I. at onai /
procass 1. n mostwaste rn c:om_int.:r Ias stai ad w1 T1ìa. vat waveof
F I ce :irc:reasesmat cres ec:Ii.n 1.974and [if-El:: Hand
:acacled by 19743 the m. n-fiat onratewasa]. most:bac:k it)Its
I rexlioc:I-:: 1.970-—-- 7-3 ].a'-.'.1Lt5tbcitor—n an olh erpr:Lc:a I"):LI-::aset:.iF)
DIEt 1.1,I9 9——SO ,Nhii. aiii ase waves Li1 1 all econc:)m Iasmore or
:i asss:imm_mi. tanaous.Ly •ti-—its-h.i'amp]. :1tm.mda and ciurat.:i ont: I .f f cam'—:i --from
onec:ountr- to another
Hi a most st rI1<1n p -4 eat: ur P (yf1: ha I °7(a—-wast I. a + aU I
out: a'I.:aSit) ci Ui a d oub11 nq o-f un amp]. oymant ti at:at: c:ompan ad
5:1c: c a ]. a i- at: ad :if 1 a I.: :on :1 F)mci st:m:ou n t: i as .inor a om'I ass at: t Ii c:- a a ina5
time. High unemployment rates persisted throughout the 1970sin
spite of a modest (and temporary) remission in 1976—78.The
second oil shock and consequent contraction in economic activity
in the industrial world brought about a further increase in
unemployment. This time, unlike the OPEC I pattern, real
interest rates in world capital markets rose substantially and
remained high into the renewed upswing of economic activity in
1983.
The difference between these shocks and the familiar
business—cycle fluctuations of the previous two decades lies
mainly in their effect on the suply and real cost of productive
factors: a real wage push at the end of the 1960s, steep
increases in energy and raw—material prices in the 1970s (in face
of rigid real wages), and sharp fluctuations in the real cost of
capital. The typical response to an input price shock in a
developed industrial economy is a rise in output prices and a
fall in profitability, output and employment. The slow—down in
economic activity is further exacerbated by demand contraction,
which may result from a combination of a direct terms—of—trade
effect on real income, anti—inflationary (plus current—account
motivated) internal contractionary macroeconomic policies, and
inter—country repercussions of analogous developments among
trading partners. Both the profit squeeze and stronger
fluctuations in output reduce the demand for investment and thus
also hamper the development of productive capacity.
While output, employment, and productivity in the industrial
countries slowed down sharply after 1973, many middlerincome4)
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2. Israel'. inflation rate was only sightly above the tlIC
average in thi first period, but rose to morethan three times
the MIC average Cand more than five times the average DECO
inflation rate) in the second period..
3. The real current account deficit relative to SOP was n
average minimal and hardly grew in the DECO countrieswhile
growing substantially among the flICs, reflecting their
expansionary borrowing and growth policies in the 19705.
Israel's relative deficit, which was already very high by
international standards in the earlier period, grew only
slightly; As we shall see, the response of current account
policy to external shocks has alotto do with the slowdown in
overall economic activity and with the rise in inflation during
part of this period.
4. Israel seems to have survived the crises with only a
modest rise in unemployment, compared to the DECO average, and in
spite of its sharp growth slowdown. As we shall see, this
apparent departure from the general pattern is misleading. The
growth of employment in the Israel's business sector contracted
sharply (Table 1, line 2)——very much in line with the typical
industrial—country performance——and the public sector took up
most of the slack.
So far we have only looked at period averages. To visualize
the main temporal developments we cast growth and inflation into
a quasi—Phillips—curve framework (Figure 1). Rather than plot
unemployment rates (which mean little in the present context), we
use deviations from mean SOP growth during 1964—Si as ourS
horizontal measure of less and more than reference 'capacity'
growth, while the vertical axis measures the rate of inflation of
consumer prices.
An argument could be made in favor of applying different
capacity growth rates for the periods before and after 1973.
However, in the case of Israel this affects mainly the size of
output deviations before 1972 without qualitatively changing the
overall picture.2 The procedure used here has the advantage of
simplicity and, moreover, requires no prior information on.
capacity growth.
The OECD figures (broken line) are here calibrated on the
working assumption that Israel's 'normal' growth and inflation
rates were double the OECD average so that a similar rule of
thumb could be applied to the deviations from the average. While
'eye—econometrics' maybe misleading, this does suggest a number
of plausible hypotheses for further study and fits in with the
following tentative economic history.
The period 1965—67 was a very deep Keynesian recession: the
implied Phillips 'curve' is very flat and its slope closely
resembles the one implied by the OECD 1965—69 group of points.
Next comes an almost horizontal line from 1967 to 1969——a
phenomenal output expansion with virtual price stability; in 1968
2. The mean output growth .f or Israel, 4.2 percent, is
slightly above tletzer's estimate of capacity growth after 1972
(5.5 percent), but considerably below his estimated rate for
1960—72 rate (9.5). Thus, y —Pshifts durihg the 1967—72
upturn are excessive while the slowdown, especially after 1977,
may be slightly overstated.9
alone output in manufacturing grew by 25 percent (capital by
only 3.6 percent), and by another 15 percent in1969 (capital by
5.9 percent). The rest of the economy also expanded rapidly.
This largejumpmust be seen against the background of the
unusually high capacity reserves built up earlier andleft idle
during the recession, and the considerable slack in thelabor
market. By the beginning of 1967 unemployment had reached 12
percent, which provided considerable reserve, on top ofwhich
came the renewed immigration and the inflow of Arab labor from
the territories after the Six Day War. These temporarily made the
labor market look like an epitome of Arthur Lewis' "economic
development with unlimited supplies of labor." By 1969—70 full
employment was gradually being approached and while growth
continued at a rapid pace, the strain of maintaining very high
rates of public expenditure Con defense, on social services and
income maintenance) was beginning to tell. The movement from 1969
to 1972 now suggests a very much steeper Phillips curve, though
still with the 'right' negative slope.
The phunomenal spurt in growth petered out by 1973. When
seen in an international comparison, the next period (1973 to
mid—1977) looks quite similar to the general bell—shaped curve
shown for the OECD countries in Figure 1. The upward slope in
1973—74 may be understood in terms of the price shock impact
which, in the case of Israel, was exacerbated by a large
devaluation and indirect tax measures, continued in the form of a
crawling peg in 1975—76. The inflationary process of both
periods can be fully accounted for within a conventional10
wage—price adjustment mechanism (Artstein and Sussman, 1979;
Bruno and Sussman, 1979, 1980), to which we return in Section V.
The story for 1975-77 is associated with the stabilization
policy adopted in 1976 which resulted in a real cut in the
government deficit and a very stringent monetary policy whose
most spectacular effect was on the current account (see below).
One might also suggest that while the output slack of 1974 (and
part of 1975, in the case of Israel) reflects a shift in the
aggregate supply curve, that of 1976—77 probably reflects
primarily shifts in aggregate demand in response to the earlier
supply shock. •(Figure I includes a separate point for Israel in
January—May 1977, not only because May 1977 marked a shift in
political regimes, but because it clearly shows that inflation
was at that time decelerating in a way that appears quite similar
to that of the OECD reference curve).3
Any analysis of the main macroeconomic trade—off s in an open
economy would be incomplete without an examination of the main
simultaneous developments in the external account. Inflation is,
after all, a measure of the strain on internal (non—tradable)
resources. Excess demand in an open economy spills over into the
tradable—goods sector and widens the import gap. The effects of
the 1973—74 events on the external accounts thus dominate the
macroeconomic responses of a small country like Israel.
3. The relative vertical distance of the two curves in May
1977 was almost down to that of 1973. Part of this deceleration
of inflation has to do with the slowing down of the creeping
devaluation and a temporary increase in food subsidies (see
Temkin, 1983).11
A convenient way of observing the developments.in relative
external dependence is to consider a quasi—Phillips curve diagram
in which the vertical axis of Figure 1 is replaced by an
'external dependence ratio', here measured as the ratio to GDPof
either the total or the civilian current account deficit (the
total deficit minus defence imports, which are not directly
related to economic activity). Interestingly enough, Figure 2
suggests an analogous time—phasing.4 During the recession
(1965—67) the civilian deficit ratio fell sharply (from 14.7
percent to 6.8 percent) subsequently returning to theearlier
level (13—14 percent by 1969—71), illustrating an obvious
trade—off between growth and the currentaccount.5 This
trade—off was dominated by the key relationship between imports —
ofraw materials and investment goods and domestic demand (more
on this in Section IV). The end of the 'euphoric' boom, 1972,is
marked by an exceptionally low deficit ratio, largely accounted
for by a remarkable export performance. Next came the Vom Kippur
War/OPEC I shock,6 again showing up as a 'perverse'
upward—sloping stagflationary shift.
This diagram illuminates the attempt made to move out of the
crisis. During the years 1975—77 the deficit ratio dropped
sharply (from 36 to 22 percent in the total and from 21 to 12
4. Figures for the sub—periods are given in Table 2.
5. A simple regression for 1964—81 of the civilian deficit
ratio on y —P(elasticity of 0.26) and the lagged terms of
trade (elasticity of —0.18) gives R2 0.29.
6. The growth in the civilian deficit ratio is already
noticeable in the first 3 months of 1973 due to a sharp rise in
imports.12
percent in the civilian deficit), clearly at the cost of a sharp
deceleration in GDP growth.
Returning to Figure 1, its most remarkable feature may be
Israel's departure from the OECD pattern after 1977. While the
horizontal shifts in deviations from GDP trend remain quite
similar, it is the vertical (inflation) co—ordinate which seems
to have taken on a life of its own, in an almost complete
dichotomy between the nominal and the real economy. The
inflationary process from the end of 1977 onwards may be viewed
as an expectations— driven monetary 'bubbler, resulting from a
change in the monetary regime. It seems to have relatively
little to do either with external world—wide shocks or with real
developments in the rest of the economy.
In Figure 2, the years after 1977 follow a zigzag path
closely related to different policy regimes of three consecutive
Ministers of Finance: Ehrlich (a rise in the civilian deficit
ratio from 12 to 17 percent during 1977—79), the brief austerity
regime of Hurowitz Ethe ratio came down to 8 percent (U in
1981], and an upward surge in the deficit during Aridor's
ill—fated anti—inflation real exchange rate appreciation policy
(the civilian deficit ratio rose to 14 percent in 1982, and has
risen further to 16.5 percent in 1983).
We now turn to consider a theoretical framework within
which the more detailed empirical analysis is to be conducted.
7. Note that this was achieved in spite of a substantial
worsening in the terms of trade and a world—wide slump.13
II ..AGGFtEGATE: SLJPF'L.Y AND AGGREGATE: DEMAND IN TI-iC SHORT RUN—— A
THEORET I CAL FRAME:WORK
In order to analyze the effects of input price shocks on the
economy one has to incorporate raw materials (n) as a separate
f act or 0+ product. on of gross output ( q ) al onn wi th GE'F( y ) wh i c:h
in turn depends on convent.i oral labor (U and c:api tal (k,)
I nputs.The determ nati on of output and prices in a system Ii ke
this can he described in terms of aggregate supply CS) a.nd
aggregate demand CD) schedul es as drawn in Ri qure 3..F-or
convenience we express net output in terms of ODE along the
C) horizontal axis. On the vertical axis we measure a rd at.ive
pri. cc(ri) —-—the pri cc of final goods(p )rd ati ye to the
domest i c pr I cc of a competi t i ye basket of goods, p 1- e
* . where prepresents the world price off i. nal goods and e the
exchange rate. iTis also the r-eci proc:al of the real exchange
r at e.
3. I . E. ., gross output C q) ., material inputs (n ) and (dOtCv
are assumed to be related in a two—stage producti on relationq
= q[y (I:: • U ni .For detailed analysis see i3runo arid Sac:hs
(1981)
9. Alternatively one could measure gross output (q) on the
horizontal ax is (Lii is is the more rd evant measure fcir a
subsectc:r 1 i k:e manufactur rig—••--ee bel ow)
10. We here define variables in terms of their logarithms;
there --+oreq the? product. of the exchange rate by the wor 1 ::i p rice
wh I c:h i s the omest i c pr i cc 0+ the wor 1 ci good) is the sLim of the
logarithms (p1- e)arid the ratio €4 the two prices is
difference of the logarithms [p — (p + e)],14
Two other relative prices play a major role in accounting
for aggregate shifts in this system. One is the relative world
price of material inputs (n p —p*)where n is the
nominal world price of materials. The other is the real cost of
labor in terms of output units or the product wage (w).
The aggregate supply of goods in the short run can be
described as an upward—sloping curve, S, which represents the
marginal short—run cost schedule. Along a given S the
productive capacity (represented here by capital stock, k), the
level of technology or total factor productivity (T), and the
real cost of the two variable factors of production, materials
and labor (i.e., n and w, respectively) are held constant.
Below a certain output level, as capacity becomes underutilized,
the supply curve may be horizontal while at a certain maximum
output level(yf) S becomes vertical as full employment is
reached. Under fairly reasonable assumptions it can be argued
that an increase in the real cost of either materials (tin) or
labor (w) will shift the supply curve (S) up and to the left,
while an increase in the capital stock (k) or in total factor
productivity (T) will in the long run shift S down and to the
right.
The curve D marks the aggregate demand schedule for this
economy. It can be derived from a conventional Keynesian open
economy framework. Other things being equal, the demand for
11. The various parameters are thus marked on respective
sides of the curve S in Figure 3.15
final goods (such as consumer goods or exports) rises with a fall
in the relativefinal goods price (n).In drawing D we again
hold constant the relative price of materials Cu1) which may
affect demand through real income and wealth, and not only
through the supply side. When the real price Of materials such
as âil rises, a net importer of these goods suffers a real income
loss while a net exporter (such as OPEC) benefits. For a
country like Israel a rise in the real cost of material inputs
certainly shifts the aggregate demand schedule to the left (this
is why nn is placed on the left hand side of D in Figure 3).
Arise in real world income (y*) which affects export demand
or expansionary domestic fiscal and monetary policy (denoted by
FM in Figure 3) which affects domestic demand for consumption
and investment goods, will each shift the D curve up and to the
right.
We can now use this framework to analyze the output and
price effects of rising input prices as well as the derived
if fects of the policy response to such input price shocks. The
first impact of rising input prices is a leftward shift of the
aggregate supply curve from S to S'——rising real costs of
inputs reduce profits and the output that producers will be
willing to supply at each given relative price level. Suppose,
for example, that there is sufficient compensatory expansionary
policy on the demand side to neutralize the contractionary effect
of rising material prices on real income, so that the demand
curve CD) stays put. In this hypothetical case, with
everything else (including real wages) held constant, rising16
material prices cause a move of the economy from the equilibrium
point A to a new equilibrium point B. There is a fall in
output and employment, and a rise in prices. This i the essense
of a stagflationary impact effect. Note that a similar
stagflationary effect of a supply shock would be observed if
there were an autonomous real wage push, exceeding productivity
growth.
The size of a material price shock depends on the behavior
of real wages. If they are downward flexible, mitigating the
squeeze on profits, this initselfmay impart a compensatory
rightward shift to the S curve. If wages are rigid (or rise),
relative to productivity CT), the leftward shift in 5, for a
given upward push on material prices, will be more pronounced.
The associated profit squeeze which hampers investment depresses
capital growth (change in k), which may further strengthen the
supply shock effect in the medium— and long—run. Such supply
shock stands in marked contrast to a shift in aggregate demand,
with the S curve held constant. In that case, prices and
output would tend to move together (compare, for example, the
points A' and B).
Consider the demand side now. Other things being equal, a
rise in raw material prices Cvrn) we have argued, depresses net
importers real income and demand, shifting the D schedule
leftward and exerting further downward pressure on output and
employment. Contractonary demand management policy Ca fall in
FM), and the mutual interaction of falling incomes in the export
markets of other industrial éountries (reducing y*), cause a-
17
further contraction of economic activity.
Suppose D shifts to D' while supplyis now represented
by S.. A new equilibrium in the commoditymarket, given the
configuration of Figure 3, will be at the point A',output
having fallen further and the final goodsrelative price also
falling in this case (a real depreciation) from it1tow0.2 The
price JgLneednot fall, hpwever, since this level also depends
on the world prices of final goods(p5 and on the exchange rate
Ce). If itisdownward rigid or there is a temporary real
appreciation, production may actually take placeat a lower
level, C, where a disequilibrium between supplyand demand may
for a time exist.
A system like this can be used to write down the
determinants Sf gross output in a subsector like manufacturing or
fordeterminingGDP in the aggregate business sector. SDP or
gross output can be expected to be inverselyrelated to and
w, and positively related to all otherdemand and supply factors
(FM, y*; k, T). A labor—demand schedule can also be derivód,
depending on whether producers maximize profits ontheir normal
supply schedule or if production is effectivelyconstrained on
the demand side (see the earlier example of the point Cin
Figure 3). Real wages will adjust gradually downwardswhen for
the whole economy GDP is less than yf, namely there is
unemployment in the labor market (see subsequent discussionof
12. When both S and D contract the outcome for itmay
obviously be either way.18
the Phillips curve). Thus over time S'may shift back to the
right.
The commodity (and labor) market framework described here
can be directly linked to the current account of the balance of
payments, by noting, as we shall do in greater detail in Section
IV, that imports are positively linked to GDP (and possibly also
to ur)and exports are negatively linked to the relative price it
andto domestic demand pressure. Thus, any leftward movement
along the horizontal axis or downward movement along the vertical
axis of Figure 3 will also signal a reduction in the real
external (civilian) deficit, and a movement in the opposite
direction——a deterioration in the deficit. In fact, changes in
the commodity market (e.g., a demand contraction) may be
deliberately designed to achieve a current—account objective
(see below).
The system could be expanded further by specifying an
independent adjustment process for the exchange rate, e (as a
function of monetary policy1 asset markets, and current account
imbalances), and for investment and capital stock (k) (a function
of profits, credit policy, housing needs of immigrants, etc.).
While these may be important for a more complete picture of the
adjustment process in a typical industrial economy, in the case
of Israel we may assume these variables to be determined outside
the system.
In the following sections we shall take up, in turn, the
application of this type of framework to output, employment, and
relative prices (Section III) and to the implications for the- 1,
currentaccount (Section IV). A complementary short discussion
ofthe nominal price system is deferred to SectionV (a more
complete discussion of inflation is relegatedto another chapter
of this volume).
III.THE INTERNAL BALANCE——OUTPUT.EMPLOYMENT. AND RELATIVE
EB1Q1
Intrying to apply the framework outlined in SectionII to real
data we shall make two modifications. First, it is easier to
conf in. the analysis of output and relative price determination
to the business sector of the economy (we shall occasionally
narrow down the illustrations even further and refer to the
manufacturing sector only) and consider the government sector as
exogenous. Thus, the vertical part of the aggregate supplycurve
will refer to 'full employment' in the business sector, i.e.,
after accounting for the labor taken up by government employment.
Second, since the emphasis is on short—run adjustments relative
to trend, rather than on the trends themselves, it isconvánient
to think of the analysis given in Figure 4 in terms of
deviations of the main variables from their respective mean
trends —6.0—6.2percent growth for GDP and domestic demand
shifts (6.9 percent for foreign demand), 2.1 percent for the
growth of labor supply, and 4 percent for the productivity trend
in real wages.
Table 3 presents the growth in the business sector's labor
supply in terms of three main compohentsi20
1. Population growth, whose main fluctuations are due to
immigration——very high in 1960—65 and 1967—73, low.during the
recession.period (1965—67) and immediately after the 1973 war.
2. The influx of workers from the administered territories
after the Six Day War (1967). After 1973 their number stayed on a
more or less even level, between 65,000—75,000 workers or 5—6
percentof the total labor force.
3.Thatpart of the labor force entering the public sector
hasto be subtracted from the potential growth of the business
sector. Th. share of the public sector in total employment rose
from 20 percent at the beginning of the 1960s (it was still only
23 percent in 1967—73) to over 29 percent at the beginning of the
1980s. The most rapid increase coincided with the exogenous
supply shock of the mid—1970s. On average, during the decade
1973—82 a potential employment growth of 1.5 percent annually in
the business sector labor force was thus diverted to public
services. Another indication of the importance of this factor is
shown by comparing lines 7 and 8 of Table 3, suggesting that if
the share of the public sector in total employment had stayed
constant at its 1969 level,13 unemployment would have reached
11.7 percent at the end of. the period (1981)——more than the OECD
average—rather than the actual level of 5 percent.
Next,we may compare the growth of the.net supply of labor
with actual employment growth (lines 4 and 5 in Table 3) as well
13. One must also assume that the participation rate of women
would have risen at the same rate as it actually did.21
as the growth of the productwage14 relative to trend (see Table
4, line 2). The data indicate a positive real wage pushin the
early and mid—1960s, followed by a considerable slackin the
labor market. The economy was recovering from the depths of 10
percent unemployment during the recession, with an increasein
immigration and an inflow of workers from the territories. Thus,
in spite of the very rapid output growth 'full' employment was
probably reached only in 1973 (the unemployment rate of 2.6
percent was the lowest ever). From then employmentgrowth
was only slightly lower than that of labor available to the
business sector.
We note that real wages were downward flexible during
1967—72, 1974—75, and again in 1980 (see also Figure 5 and
related discussion). The real wage push of 1975—79 can be partly
accounted for by the increased pressure of public sector demand
for labor, and partly by the accelerated inflation which, under
one version of the Phillips curve (Elkayem, 1982; see regression
8 in Table 6), accounts for this particular increase.
Regressions for nominal or real cost—of—living—deflated wages
carried out by various authors (Artstein and Sussman, 1977;
14. Defined as the nominal wage in the business sector
deflated by I3DP prices.
15. A complementary explanation rests on the repercussions on
the business sector of an exogenous wage explosion in the
strongly unionized and sheltered public sector. During 1976—79
the real wage of public sector employees grew at an average 11
percent per annum while the total economy's real wage growth was
7 percent. There is some evidence of a 'reverse Scandinivian
Model' at work in those years (i.e., the 'sheltered' sector
dictating the wage of the 'exposed' sector, rather than the22
Kondor, 1982; Elkayam, 1982) all point to the importance o
labor—slack variables Coverall unemployment as well as the share
of workers from the territories) in accounting for aggregate real
wage behavior during this period.
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Let us now turn to actual output and relative price data by
subperiod, and attempt to associate the development with
underlying shifts in supply and demand schedules. Lines 6—8 of
Table 4 give output growth rates, relative to trend, for total
GOP,17 business sector GOP, and gross output in manufacturing,
all showing more or less the same pattern. Line 9 gives the mean
growth rate of the relative consumption to export price ratio,
revealing a fall Ci.e., real depreciation) in the first and last
two sub—periods,18 and an increase in the two middle periods.
• The upper part of Table 4 gives the data for various
elements of the supply curve Ccapital stock, product wage and
relative import prices) followed by"%easures of demand shifts:
domestic demand (represented by changes in public consumption and
investment, which are deemed quasi—exogenous) and world market
demand.
There are three sub—periods with unambiguous supply shifts:
S
reverse).
16. In Elkayam's study the change in real wages is regressed
on the lagged real wage level as a proxy for labor demand in the
measure of unemployment.
• 17. rhese are identical mirror images of the horizontal
•shifts in Figures 1 and 2. We repeat our earlier reservation
concerning the implied uniform trend. This does not affect the
subsequent regression results, however (see below).
18. In the latter part of the period(1979—81) this variable
shows an increase Creel appreciation), as does the subsequent
period (1981—83) which was excluded here.23
negative in 1965a67 (real wage push), positive in 1967—69 (large
real wage drop) and negative again in 1972—75 (OPEC 1 input price
shock). In other sub—periods the various indicators give
conflicting signals and are in any casesmall.19 The direction of
demand shifts is almost always the same as that of the output
shifts, with the exception of 1972—75 which is ambiguous; here
domestic demand continued to grow for a while (mainly on account
of defence expenditures) in spite of the crisis. The output
contraction in that period is thus dominated by the supply
shock.
The story that emerges from this impressionistic analysis is
best told in terms ot the trijectory and curves in Figure 4.
The recession (1965—67) came as a reaction to an earlier boom
(including a real wage explosion) and was largely a Keynesian
demand (mainly investment) contraction. This was followed after
the Six Day War by a sharp positive supply shift (S1 to
in which unprecedented demand expansion tD1 to D2) could be
sustained at no inflation with a concommitant real
19. Weighting of the various factors, using regression
results for manufacturing, gives a small positive number for
1969—72, a small negative one for 1975—77, and ambiguous results
for 1977—al which is an uneven period anyway (see below).
20. There was a formal nominal devaluation of 17 percent in
1967, absorbed with only a slight price increase (see Fi9ure
l).2l The official rate was devalued from 4.20 IL/S prior to74
'20 deprec: iat.i on a heper i od 1969—72 saw continued demand expansion
with only slight (or no) additional supply reserves. Full
emp 1 oyment. was reached on 1 y around 1972 (the P01 nt A7 was thus
mar k:ed at the j unct on of the vertical ii ne oncurve S)Then
came a negative supply shock (S; to E3; )whi 1 e domestic
demand cont i nued to rice for a vh :1.1 e (toD._; Theyears1974 77
were c:iomi nated by a sharp demand squeeze together- wi Lii a series
of nominal devaluations targeted towards the c:urr-ent acc:ount
At: the same t: i me no unemp 1 ovment emerned as the pub 1 i c sec:t:.or
continued to grow (see earl i er di scussi on and Table 3) .22
The subsequent years., 1977--Si are much harder to
charac:ter i ze in terms of the underl yJ nq modelThese are the
years of runaway inflation whi cii proi:abl y affecterJ the real side
of the economy (product i vi ty slowdown?) in ways that el Ltde
quanti i cationDet:rendi rig the rnaiii vari abl es (output, demand
real wages) at the mean rate + or 1964--Si may here b i as the
picture i + the underlying poterit:ial output trend dec:l med.. One
year +or which a demand contraction c:ari c: 1 early be i dent:i fl ed i s
1980 (theHurowitz aust.er ty program)Dun ng the rest of the
pen od the fl uc:tuat ions in Figur-e4 are dominated by i rrequl an
1974 to about :10:iri the c:ourse ofyears he real. depiec: I :\L :i.on
cii own here was., c:rf cour se muc:h small or ——-—of the ord er of about
20 percent. of the nom i nal deprec i ati on
21,, The offi c:ial rate was devalued from4,20 IL_/Spriorto
1974 to :iboLtt 10 1. n the c:ounse of 3 years,he ne:tal deprec:i at:i on
shownii en e was •ofc our-se •muc:hsmall or jf t:he on d er of about:
20penc:ent of the nomi iia1 depnec: i at i on
2.2. Th i s i s shown in Figure4 bya1 eftward sh i ft i r' the
verti cal pc:int:i on c:ifS_.1:1:is possib.L e that. the supply curve
itself also c:ontinuec:itoshift:up during this peric3d25
relativeprice changes There wasasharp temporary devaluation
in 1978 (with E:hrlich sOctober 1977 turnabout) areal
appreciationepisode inthe second hal-fof1978ollo d by
anotherimport price shockanddevaluation in 1979—80,an
artificialdec:elerat.ion of inflation during the 1981e:lection
campaign, anda morerecent real appreciation episode in198l—B2
While thesef].uctuationsshowup in thenumbers-for re:I.ative
prices, it is not clear whether the associated output
observations canbe cast into the earlier moldo-f equ:LLibrium
supplyanddemandconfiqurations They seem,inpartat ieast
morelike temporary disequilibria (see analysis inSection II)
Withdemand -f 1uctuati ons domi nating the scene,it is hard to
suggesta simple formal econometric model for the aggregate
economy that includes independent demandvariables not inherently
correlated w:it.h the c3DF -fluctuations whic:h they are supposed to
explainA model that incorporates the above elements can,
however, be applied to alarge sub—sectorlikemanu-facturi nç
The equations showninlinesi—3of Table 5 followthelogic o-f
the abovemodel by regressing grossoutput perunito-f c:apital in
manufacturing on two relevant real cost variables (real
manufacturing wage relative totrendand the relative priceof
industriali nputs) as well as thetwodemand van abl esshownin
Table4. The signs andsizesof the coe+ficents are quite
reasonable (except for theeffecto-f -foreign demand which is
23.Thevariablesactuallyused are the residuals froma
regression of each variable on itslagged value. Thus the
uniform trend problem is avoided.26
relatively small and insignificant). Wenote that when the last
three years C1979—B2) are omitted the regression results (line 1)
improve substantially, which supports the earlier argument and
casts doubt on the relevance of the model to the more turbulent
recent period.
While we cannot run the same model f or the aggregate
business economy, a partial attempt is shown in Table 6
(regressions 1—2) with the change in real credit (a quasi—
exogenousvariable)24 proxying for the pressure of demand and a
significant and large coefficient for the terms of trade,
probably catching both supply and demand aide—effects. Table 6
also shows a number of aggregate labor demand regressions in
which GDP is the dominant factor, while real wages, though
negative, are insignificant. Note that when one allows for
differences in labor demand response to an upward EAt(+)] or
downward EAt(—)] change in growth rates the differences in
coefficients cole out as expected (once 196S is dummied out——see
ràgression 5). During an upswing the growth.of labor per unit of
output (61 —At)slows down (i.e., productivity growth
accelerates) while the reverse is true for a downswing. All of
this lends support to the argument that the fall in demand after
1973 may partly account for the productivity slowdown (see
Metzers chapter in this volume).
The behavior of thec product wage and the fluctuations in
output growth (At is the acceleration in SDP growth) give a
24. Sea Brezis, Leiderman and Melnik (1982).27
good expl anati on of the changes in the rate of prof it on capital
for the business sector,, The underlying observations are qi yen
in Figure 5, referred to earlier in the context of real wage
flexibility observed for some periods, and the estimated
factor—price--curve is presented in line t) of Table 6 (note the
high R2in spite of First differences)An earlier factor
price curve esti mated for the manufacturing sector by Bar--Nathan
1983) is reproduced i ri line 6 of Tahi e 5. Here the basis is a
gross output framework (rather than GDF) with wages deflated by
the output pri cc. Thus, raw material prices appear separately in
the regression. Demand fluctuations are prox ted by labor
intensity (hours per worker) .The combi nati on of the + actor
price and producti vity equations fable 5. lines 4-5) ot yes a.
reasonably goOd account of profit and productivity chanq es in
manufactur ng. Raw materials al one account for .35 percent of the
slowdown in total produc:ti vi ty after 1973, the demand proxy
accounts for another 24 percent, leaving 41 percent as an
unexplained residual in Bar—Nathan' 5 analysis. Bar—Nathan has
recently successfully esti mated a similar model for the
constructi on sector in Israel, where demand fluctuations have
played a parti cul arly i mportant rol c.
The hehavi or of the rate of profit, though interesting in
itself, is not further analyzed here as its effect on ac:tual
investment behavior in Israel is at best tenuous (see Mayshar' s
chapter in this volume)
We have shown that the hehavi or of output, employment, and
the related real cost of raw materials (it) and of labor w) n2e
conveniently fall into the framework of short—run supply and
demand shifts suggested in Section II. The demand shifts,
especially in 1975—77, were closely related to current account
developments, to which we now turn.
IV. THE EXTERNAL BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT
In Section II we indicated how developments in the commodity
market may be linked with (or even driven by) the size of the
current—account balance. The following discussion does not
purport to be an exhaustive analysis of the externalaccount;25
it merely provides a complementary link in the overall picture of
the domestic response to the external shocks during the period
under discussion.
A relatively simple way of analysing the behavior of the
current account is to consider both imports and exports as
functions of a shift variable and of relative prices. After we
weed out imports for defence and the import component of
production for exports we are left with the import component of
domestic uses. These imports (n) will be related to the growth of
domestic uses (h) and to the relative price of imports —p),
with elasticities n and TLn respectively.26 Likewise, we
may relate net exports Cx) to the expansion of Israel's
25. Much greater detail may be found in Halevi (1983).
26. 'Lisdefined so as to be a positive number (i.e., it is
minus tHe normal price elasticity).29
external markets (fl and to the relative priceof exports and
domestic uses —p),with elasticities and
respectively. The change in the real civiliandeficit CD), may
thus be related to the change in the variousvariables according
to the followingformula:27
(1) baNwnI;_Xv/_tNMinC;nF) +X(c)]
The change in the real current account can thus be
decomposed into three major components: the shift in importsin
response to domestic demand, the shift in exportsin response to
elternal demand, and a third term Cm square brackets),
constituting the competitive factor——the response to changesin
relative prices. This last term mainly represents the roleof an
effective real depreciation or appreciation of the exchange
rate.
In applying equation (1) to the data we employed two
alternative sets of coefficients. One set (A) assumes n a1x
a a 0.25,
Ik,a 1,and is based on earlier published
studies of import and exportdemand.28 The other set of
coefficients (B) is based on a simple regression performed on
the relevant data: maI.5,Yxa1.14,na 0, TLxa1.41.In
27. Capital letters denote the actual variables (like
imports, N, and exports X) while small lettersdenote their
logarithms and dotted variables are time shifts of the same
(i.e., ñ is the growth ofN, etc.).
28. See, e.g., Weinblatt (1972) for imports and Halevi (1972)
for exports. These elasticities were used in an earlier version
of this analysis (Bruno, 1980). They are also confirmed by more
recent econometric work by Melnik (work in progress, Bank of
Israel).:10
case B imports are assumed to be price--inelastic: but with a
consi. derabl y h:i qher expenditure ci ast:i city (probably
unreality hi gh——-see below) while the export prjc:e
ci ast i citycomes out hi gher than in earl icr estimates.. However
the ciifferencebetween the two modelsin the estimated r-ole of
the compe:•t.i ti ye fac:tor is rather small Table 7 presents the
results of this analysis for the two sets of coe-ff i c:i ents..L.i ne
J. ) g i yes the c:hange ., by sub—per i od .,:1 n the c:urr ent acc ount at.
c:urrent pr cesq 1 inc (2) is an estt mate of the effect of c:hanqes
in the ext. ernal terms of trade
(pNI -- p*X)from which the residual the ci vi 1 ian deficit at
c:onstant prices (1 inc 3) • is obt.aned..
While the models cii ffer in the extent of overall
explanation by sub pen od (e.. q..A cii yes a better fit. in
1968--72.B in 1973-74) they both seem quite off the mar Ic in
1978—SO.. Most of th i s can be traced to a 1 arqer --than- expected
C? temporary drop in the clef i cit in 198t).Both model s give very
si mi 1 ar estimates of the role of rd at i ye compet i ti veness £1 I nes
(6) and (7) ]Compar i nq the two pr i cc shoc: Ic periods we note that
i n both 197 74 and 1978—80 the terms of trade cost a 1 most:. $1
billion. he fir-t per-od saw a worsen]nq of the real defic:it
pr i mar ii. y on account. of cont. i nued :1 mport cx pansl on .. Th :1 s was
29.. A temporary ri se i 1 pr i vate savi rigs and a fal 1 i n
investment (p1 us i nvent:ory movemi:nts ) suqc?sts t:he cx p1 anat ion
q i yen :1 n Lay i e and Sussman s account ( f orthcomi rig ) ..Note t:.hat. in
our model Awhen both adj acent per i ods are taken tügether
197f3—198',3)the esti mate fits in we]. 131
halted in 1975—77 with the large domestic squeeze described in
Section III. During the second price shock (1979—SO) the large
terms—of—trade loss was absorbed with greater ease.
1961—82 seems to have been the worst period from the point
of view of macro—economic performance. In spite of an improvement
in the terms of trade (of about $300 million) the rise in
domestic import demand and the substantial real appreciation
brought about a very large increase in the deficit. The mast
marked development is the real appreciation episode of 1981—82
which cost around $450 million in those two years alone (and
further exacerbated in 1983), more than the total gain earlier
obtained with real depreciation between 1974 and 1980. As we
shall see, this was the price paid f or a stabilization policy
that did not even pay off in terms of disinflation.
While an import—export view of the current account seems to
fit the short—term movements of the deficit reasonably well, in
the long— and medium—run an alternative, or supplementary,
savings—investment view is no less —perhapseven more —
instructive.Here we take the increase in net indebtedness as
financing net investment, the difference being made up out of
domestic savings. Table 8 shows that in both 1962—67 and 1968—72
the economy managed to finance, on the margin, 80—90 percent of
its total net capital accumulation from domestic savings (line
4). When we subtract non—business investment (mainly housing)
from both numerator and denominator, this ratio drops to 50
percent in the second period (line 4a).
The picture after 1973 is radically different: while annual32
investment dropped sharply, particularly in the business sector,
the foreign debt continued to increase and domestic savings were
negative, due to rising government deficits and falling private
savings ratios (see Mayshar, forthcoming). Defence imports fail
to provide an explanation of ri'sing total indebtedness since
these were largely financed by grants. As line 5 of Table 8
shows, the defence imports that had to be financed from other
sources fell between the two periods. The price of a much
reduced growth rate while consumption, particularly private
consumption, continued to grow almost unabated, shows up most
clearly here.
The net domestic savings.ratio as a percentage of GNP plus
transfers from abroad dropped sharply after 1972—75, from around
15 percent at the height of the boom, to an annual average of 2
percent in 1974B1.3O This drop is fairly evenly divided between
.a reduction in the private savings ratio after 1973 and a rise in
the public sector deficit, which first emerged during the
recession. As shown in Berglas (1983), the public sector's -
sharplyrising gross tax receipts (reaching over 50 percent of
GNP in the late 19705) failed to keep up with the rise in public
outlays, mainly on account of transfers and subsidies (which
reached 30 percent of GNP in the second halfof the 1970s
compared to. 12—15 percent in the earlier period).
30. See Bank of Israel Report for 1982, Table Sa. In 1981
the number came down to —1.5 and in 1982 to —4.4. When
unilateral transfers are left out the numbers are negative
throughout.
.Even thouqh the f or-el qn debt. as we have seen. cont j. nued to
i ncrease af tar 1973, i t grew much more' sl owl y (sea bot tornof
Table 8) , though still faster than the growth rate qf GDP..
Comparedwith the qroup of LDCs whose average real debt qrew by 9
percent annually in the decade 1972—82, Israel s debt grew by
only 4. 6 percent annual 1 y.Having started from a very high
debt level Israel avoi ded the strategy followed by many other
semi —I ndustri all z ed c:ountr i es. Whether voluntary or otherwise,
the cost of the r-esponse to the external shocks in terms of
growth and investment forgone was very high
V.THE TFtADE-OFF BETWEEN THE: EXTERNAL BALANCE AND INFLATION
Looktrig again at. Figure 1wenote the general si ml lar i tv between
the i if 1 at ion—-output trade—-off in Israel and the i. ndustr i al
countries dur i nci the period 1965—77.. Admi tt.edl y , the OE:C1) data
have to be ID 1 own up by a factor of 2 4 or Ui I s compar i son,.Al so,
we note that dun nq the DF:EC I shock and its aftermath lsraei
inf lati on was consi derably hi qher than the pre—-shock relative
norm' would suggest .I-1owever .. the pattern 0+ i nt 1 at ion during
that. period can be cx p1 ci ned once we take i nto account the sari as
of devaluations under-taken between 1974 and ic1.7 7 as part of the
current--account. tarpeted ad.i ustment pa]. i cy.In the 4:ace, of
quast —full employment, growing public sector out lays,and an
31 . By 1982—83 the real debt anai ii rose much more r api dl 'v.34
already well—indexed economy, such large—scale devaluations (from
4.2 IL/S before November 1974 to 10.5 IL/S just before the
devaluation of October 1977) were bound to result in an
accelerated inflation rate, with only a very partial pay—off in
real competitiveness. The analysis of the relationship between
exchange rate adjustments and the wage—price mechanism has been
discussed in considerable detail elsewhere (e.g., Bruno and
Sussman, 1979, 1980). A much quoted pair of wage and price
equations estimated by Artstein and Sussman (1977) for annual
data, 1955—1974, gives
(2) —0.04 + 0.ó7e + 0.25 + 0.14(th —9) +
• (0.11) (006)n (0.08)
(2 0.94)
(3) =—0.04+ 0.82ñ + 0.47.(1/U1) —2076a0.03d
(0.10)(0.10) (11.88) (0.01)
(2 0.95)
Here p is the (log) consumer price index, w is the nominal
wage, n are import prices, m is the log of narrowly—defined
money (M1) (dots, as before, are time changes), t is the log of
an indirect tax factor (1 + tax rate, u is unemployment, ta is
the share of workers from the territories, and d is a dummy
variable for years of wage freeze.




+0.31(ii— *) + 2.22E
The modal gave a fairly accurate account of the inflationary
process for both the earlier years of relative pricestability
as well as the subsequent acceleration, including an
out—of—sample forecast to 1975 and 1976.
The coefficients of equation (4) suggest that an increase in
the annual rate of devaluation from 6.6 percent in 1967—72 to
32.5 percent in 1974—77 could by itself account for 14.5 percent
cceleration in the annual inflation rates between the two
periods. A 5 percent drop in unemployment would account for a
further acceleration of 3.5 percent. This may have been all that
was needed to account for the higher rate of inflation in Israel
during the said period, not counting the acceleration in money
growth, on the one hand, and the mitigating effect of a 4 percent
wage—frieze (in 1974) on theother.32
In discussing Figure 1, we noted the very different pattern
of accelerated inflation after 1977. The above model in its
original form can indeed be shown to predict much less well for
that period. The wage equation, in particular, has to be
modified (see, e.g., Elkayam, 1982) and one would also have to
reinterpret the meaning of tmoneyP in the price equation.
32. To the extent that there was some indexation of money to
inflation already during that period equation (4) could be
applied to work out the implied larger role of devaluation on
inflation. For example, if the elasticity of money with respect
to prices is 1/3, the indirect effect would be to augment the
total role of the other factors in equation (4) by about 1036
However, there is more to this matter than merely applying a set
of updated coefficents. The data indicate an inherently
different process associated with the change in the nature of the
exchange rate regime (probably starting with the crawling peg in
1975——see Gottlieb and Peterman, 1982) and in particular with
the liberalization of foreign exchange control in 1977. This
process, as well as the explicit introduction of financial asset
formation, merit a separate detailed discussion. The apparent
dichotomy between the real economy and the 'nominal' system
during the latter period also justifies confining our emphasis in
the presint paper to the narrower aspects of the
inflation/balance—of—payments trade—off.
Having mentioned the relationship between the balance of
payments and inflation via devaluations one may raise an
obviously related question: in what way is this a symmetric
two—way relationship; has the exchange rate ever served as a
stabilizing device? This question rises particularly in the
context of the 1981—83 real appreciation episode (see earlier
discussion). While we return to the general issue in another
paper, we should point out here that the experience of both this
and earlier periods suggests that the effect of upward and
downward adjustments in the exchange rate is not symmetric.33
The following is a quarterly regression of inflation
acceleration (tA= — A1) runon its own three lags and on
percent.
33. See Bruno and Sussman (1979) for earlier quarterly
evidence on this asymmetry.37
the acceleration (M+) and deceleration CM—) of the exchange
rate——the data arefor 79quarters from 1964.1 to 1983:3 (numbers





(0.37)(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
O. 16M
(0.09
(2 a Ø55, DW = 1.80)
Thecoefficient for upward adjustment (0.32) is double that for
downward changes C0.16).
When the separate exchange rate terms are combined into one
CM) the coefficient becomes 0.22 C°°'), similar to that
found in earlier studies. When the period is broken down into
subperiods, the results show relative symmetry in response before
and larger asymmetry since the institution of the crawling peg
(1975:3). The coefficiehts for upward and downward adjustment in
a regression run over 1975:3 to 1983:3 are, respectively, 0.29
(0.11)and0.10 (S.t5)thesecond coefficient being
statistically insignificant.
A model like the one given above can be used to evaluate the
recent attempt to lower the inflation rate by slowing down the
rate of devaluation. Even on the conservative assumption implied
by equation 5 (which may be unduly optimistic) consider the
implication of a one—time reduction of I by 6 percent per
34. The implied coefficient for the rate of inflation on its
own lags can be worked out from the equation by subtraction of
0.51 from 1, 0.30 from 0.51, etc.38
quarter or a 1.5 percent monthly rate such as was started in the
third quarter of 1982. The contemporaneous effect in the same
quarter is estimated to be an inflation deceleration of only 0.24
percent a month (relative to a monthly inflation of 7—8 percent)
followed by further deceleration in the subsequent quarters of
0.12, 0.11, 0.12, —0.01 percent in the monthly rates, adding up
S
after one year to a monthly deceleration of about 0.6 percent.
Even if such deceleration had in fact taken place (for which the
evidence is not conclusive) the cumulative implication is a
marginal real appreciation, after 4 quarters, of 16 percent.
Real appreciation of at least that order of magnitude accounts
for the loss of net foreign exchange receipts which was discussed
in Section IV. Moreover, the accelerated inflation that
followed the large correcting devaluation in the last quarter of
1983 turned this particular experiment into a dismal failure. A
large foreign exchange loss was incurred with zero or even
negative net gain on the inflation front. By the end of 1983,
balance of payments pressures had thus returned to the forefront
of economic policy.
While the costs of inflation in a highly indexed economy are
hard to measure directly, indirect indicators suggest that the
cost in real resources may be quite high. One aspect is
obvious——the resources,now devoted to financial activities, i.e.,
attempts by individuals and firms 'to run in order to stay in
place', must be very high. One published aggregate statistic is
the share of employment in the financial sector——of the total
increase in employment in the business sector from 1977 to 198139
(87,000 employees on a 903,000 base in 1977) 38 percent (i.e.,
33,000 employees) went into financial and business services, a
sector that by 1977 already accounted for 7.2 percent of total
employment.35 There is no doubt that many more of the employees
formally classified as belonging to the production part of the
business sector are kept busy mending corporate financial fences
against inflation. Likewise, it is a common observation that the
allocation of time of households has shifted fromwork and
leisure alike to the more lucrative business of portfolio
management under three—digit inflation.
Another cost item that eludes quantification is the: loss of
efficiency caused by the deterioration of the price system as a
signalling device both for household consumption ahd for company
investment decisions. The unexplained residual in productivity
slowdown calculations (see Pletzer, 1983) and the erratic
movements in the real economy, already discussed in Section III,
must be closely related to the high and variable inflation rate.
35. Leaving out business services, a comparable number for
financial services alone during the shorter period 1977—81 is 23
percent on the margin, on a 5 percent base. Kleiman has recently
prepared a more detailed estimate of these costs of inflation.40
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industrial—country slowdown, without the atcompanying overt signs
of massive unemployment. At the same time, it did not display
the internal flexibility of monetary and incomes policies that
characterized a small low—unemployment country like Austria. Nor
could it afford the expansionary stance of countries like Korea
or Singapore.
The failures of the post—1977 period are in some ways much
more serious, mainly on account of Israel's rapid inflation. The
most marked difference between the post—1977 inflationary
'bubble' and the earlier (1973—75) two—digit inflation is the
loss of monetary control that characterized the later episode.
While th. earlier period was highly inflationary by international
standards, it could at least be argued that inflation was to
some extent 'functional'. It was a costly, and probably only
partly avoidable, by—product of a conscious attempt to improve
the country's competitiveness in the face of a severe foreign
exchange shortage. Nothing of the sort can be said for the
period after 1977. By 1977 the foreign exchange constraint had
been alleviated, at least temporarily, foreign capital markets
were more accessible, inflation was receding, and an effort could
have been made at that time to stabilize the economy further,
restructure its productive system, and embark on a more rapid
growth path even at the cost of some additional long—term
borrowing.
In retrospect, 1977 turned out to be a crucial cross—roads.
During the 2—3 years before the next oil shock set in, the
economy could have used the time to correct its 'structural'42
mistakes (a lesson well learned in some other small European
economies; Finland, for example, embarked on a successful
medium—term plan at about that time). Instead, the change of
political regimes signalled only one institutional economic
change which proved disastrous. The financial opening—up of the
economy to short—term external capital flows (and the
&
unnecessarilylarge devaluation that signalled its start) without
any accompanying fiscal or liberalization measures locked the
economy into a new inflation—cum—low—growth trap from which it
can apparently no longer extricate itself without another major
institutional reform.43
Table1.Annual Average Rate of Change,SelectedVariables, I8rael and


















2.EmploymentW 3.7 1.1 1.2 0.7 4.0 2.9
3.GDP per employed person 5.5 2.2 3.6 2.0 2.7 3.0
4.Gross investment 11.0 -2.9 6.4 0.4 8.9 6.6
5.Public consumption 15.1-0.l-'4.8 2.3 9.9 6.6


















4.8 3.6 e/ 6.2—- -
9.
Small numerals are mean standard deviations.
Israelis data refer to the business sector; see Metzer (1983).
The figure for 1972-80 is 5.5 percent (in the 1973 war year public
consumption grew by 45 percent).
1965-73 for the first period, 1973-79 for some MICs in the second
period. Figures give percentage ratios in constant 1975 prices.
Unemployment at the end of 1982 was 8.8 percent.
Sources: Lines 1, 4 through 6, and 8--OECD, National Income Accounts,
and IBRD World Tables (for MICs and Israel).
Line 2--ILO statistics.
Line 7--IMF, International Financial Statistics.Table 2.Selected Serie8 by Subperiod1960-1981
(Mean percentage growth rates)
1960-651965-671967-721972-751975-771977-81
Business sector
GDP 9.4 -0.2 13.9 3.5 2.8 3.8
Capital stock 10.6 7.3 7.8 8.6 5.7 4.1
Manhours 4.4 -5.8 7.4 -0.5 -0.1 2.0
Product wage 6.0 11.3 0.9 3.0 7.6 1.5
Real rate
/ ofreturn!. 14.3 9.6 21.6 19.5 16.3 16.3
National accounts
Private consumption 9.7 2.1 8.1 5.4 4.0 5.8
Public consumption 9.9 24.6 10.3 19.5 -11.1 3.8
Investment 10.9 -19.3 24.5 1.8 -10.3 -1.7
Exports 12.7 10.4 17.8 4.3, 13.6 4.7
Imports 12.0 6.9 15.2 14.1 -3.8 4.2















Consumer prices 7.2 5.0 7.1 33.0 33.0 94.2
End-of-period levels; in percent.
Sources: Business sector data based on Metzer (1983).
National accounts and other data--CBS, Statistical Abstract of
Israel, various years.Table 3. Labor Supply to the Busineee Sector, Employment, and
Unemployment,1960-1982









Sources of labor supply to
5.2 1.0 4.1 2.2 3.2 3.3
business sector
1. From population growth
2. Workers from the admi-
nistered territories 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.1 -0.2 0.3
3. Less: Employment in the
public sector -0.9 -0.2 -1.8 -2.6 -1.2 -1.3
4. Equals: Growth rate in
laborsupplyb/ (1. +2.+3.)—4.3 0.8 3.6-0.3 1.8 2.3
5. Growth in employment,
business sector 4.3 -3.7 5.4 -0.6 1.2 1.9
Aggregate unemployment rate(percent)













a/—Wehave chosen 1973, rather than 1972, as the end year here because
the definitions of the labor force were changed in that year.
Net labor supply to the business sector is defined as total labor force
including workers from the territories, minus employment of the public
sector.
Defined as end-of-period aggregate unemployment plus excess of public
sector over 1969 percentage.
Source: CBS, Statistical Abstract 1983 (and earlier years).46
Table 4. Supply and Demand Shifts,. Output, and Relative Price Changes
by Subperiod, 1965-1982





































4. Domestic (C +I) -6.216.9
•
5.9 4.4'-l7.3-4.1 6.1
5. Foreign (y*) -0.5 5.3 1.7 -2.1 2.5 -4.2 6.9
Output
6. Total GDP -4.48.14.4-1.7-4.8-2.3 6.0
7. Business sector -6.411.25.4-2.7—3.4-2.4 6.2
8. Manufacturing
output -7.915.3 3.6-2.8-2.3-3.8 7.0
9. Relative dcrnestic
price(ii)-1 -0.7—5.4 0.8 0.7-7.1-2.5'-
WExceptfor lines 3 and 8, in which figures are not detrended.
The numbers for subperiods are--1977-79: +0.5 percent, 1979-81: -4.5
percent. In 1982-83, the real wage again rose sharply.
Leaving out defense and aircraft imports the number is only 0.9 per-
cent.
Measured in terms of domestic consumption/export prices.
1979-81: +0.6 percent.
Sources: See Table 2. Foreign demand variable (y*) is based on Bank of











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This consists mostly of
tion.
the effect of real depreciation or apprecia-
1968 1973 1975 1978 1981
-72 —74 -77 -80 -82
1.Change in deficit at
current prices -203 3071,433 -444 5271,002
2.International terms
of trade 28 -418 781 -108 993 -318
3.Change in deficit at
constant 1975 prices -231 788 652 -336 -4661,320
Of which:
Change in relative prices'
4. A 42 -159 94 -204 -194 449
5. B 7 —126 77 -191 -128 441
Estimated import shift
6. A 511,597 555 3 456 797
7. B 76 2,396 833 5 6841,196
Estimated export shift
8. A -187 -691 -292 -377 —318 —205
9. B -213 -788 -333 -430 -363 -234
10.Total ex-plczined A —94 747 357 —578 —561,041
11. B —1301,482 577 —616 2931,40350






Total' 1,279 2,244 2,750 1,805 1,960
la. Business sector 628 1,052 1,088 668 846
2. Increase in net
foreign debt 125 536 1,433 770 645
3. Net domestic savings:
Total [1. minus 2.1] 1,154 1,708 1,317 1,035 1,315
3a. Savings for invest-
ment in business
sector [la. minus 2.] 503 516 -345 -102 201
4. Share of domestic
savings [3. +1.] 0.90 0.76 0.48 0.57 0.67
4a. Share for business
sector [3a. +la.] 0.80 0.49 -0.32 -0.15 0.24
5. Defense imports net
of grants 221 595 364 70 319




The total includes investment in housing and public-sector buildings.
Sources: National accounts and balance-of-payments data expressed in
dollars and deflated by Israel's export price for manufacturers.
Line 5: See Ber1as (983.
LDC debt: Ior1dDevelopment Report, 1982.51
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Figure 5. Rate of Return (1975 prices) and Product Wage (detrended at
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